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ABSTRACT
In July 2012, the Court of Justice rendered the judgment in Fra.bo, a case about the liability 
of a German private standards body under the free movement of goods. In October 2012, 
the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation 1025/2012 on European 
Standardization, the long awaited formal legal framework for the cooperation between the 
Commission and the European Standards Organizations. It is very unlikely that either the 
Court or the Union legislators were planning in these instances to a2 ect a radical overhaul 
of the New Approach to technical harmonization. And yet, that is exactly what they did. 
4 e result of Fra.bo and the new Regulation is to subject European harmonized standards 
to judicial challenge by any disgruntled manufacturer of products excluded or adversely 
a2 ected by the contents of such a standard.
To have each and every manufacturer or importer complain in each and every court of 
the Union about each and every harmonized standard that adversely a2 ects its position on 
the market, however, is much more likely to lead to wholesale paralysis than it is to increase 
the procedural integrity of European standardization.
Keywords: Court of Justice; European governance; free movement of goods; product 
safety; technical standards
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§1. INTRODUCTION
In July 2012, the Court of Justice rendered the judgment in Fra.bo, a case about the 
liability of a German private standards body under the free movement of goods.1 In 
October 2012, the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation 1025/2012 on 
European Standardization, the long awaited formal legal framework for the cooperation 
between the Commission and the European Standards Organizations.2 It is very unlikely 
that either the Court or the Union legislators were planning in these instances to ab ect 
a radical overhaul of the New Approach to technical harmonization. And yet, that is 
exactly what they did. d e result of Fra.bo and the new Regulation is to subject European 
harmonized standards to judicial challenge by any disgruntled manufacturer of products 
excluded or adversely ab ected by the contents of such a standard.
While there is a lot to be said for judicial review of private standards, it is not without 
its issues. A deliberate new approach to the New Approach might have addressed these 
issues and might have struck a sensible settlement. But as it has come about, it may be 
feared that it will create more problems than it solves. d is article will f rst rehearse a 
short history of the New Approach and the importance for its development of the lack 
of legal status of harmonized standards. It will then, in section 3, analyse Fra.bo and its 
– largely unnoticed – consequences. Section 4 will discuss the possibilities for judicial 
review opened up, unwittingly, by the new Regulation in combination with the Lisbon 
Treaty’s amendments of Article 263 TFEU, with concluding remarks in section 5.
§2. A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE NEW APPROACH
d e ‘New Approach’ to technical harmonization and standards was launched in 1985 as 
a policy response to two major interrelated problems.3 On the one hand, the plethora 
of divergent national private standards had proved a major obstacle to the completion 
of the internal market. Being ‘private’, they were widely held to be beyond the scope 
of what is now Article 34 TFEU; by the same token, they were also out of the reach of 
Community harmonization measures for lack of competence.4 d is could, of course, 
have been solved by a major legislative eb ort to replace all private standards with 
technical specif cations laid down in public Community law. But that enterprise, known 
in retrospect as the ‘old approach’, was doomed to failure: product-by-product, hazard-
1 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, Judgment of 12 July 2012, not yet reported.
2 Regulation 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Standardisation, 
[2012] OJ L 316/12.
3 See generally H. Schepel, 4 e Constitution of Private Governance – Product Standards in the Regulation 
of Integrating Markets (Hart, Oxford 2005).
4 Authoritative frustration in A. Mattera, ‘Les nouvelles formes de protectionnisme économique et les 
Articles 30 et suivants du Traité CEE’, 26 Revue du Marché Commun (1983), p. 252.
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by-hazard harmonization through Community decision-making resulted in fantastically 
complicated and detailed directives on matters of sometimes questionable importance 
which, moreover, took so long to be adopted that they were ow en outdated long before 
they entered into force.5 With negative integration out of the reach of Union law and 
positive integration unable to break the deadlock, the internal market seemed to be an 
impossible project.
A solution to the f rst problem was pioneered by the 1983 ‘Information Directive’.6 
Part of the purpose of that piece of legislation was to encourage the Europeanization of 
standards by the standards community itself. To that end, it propped up the languishing 
European standards bodies CEN and CENELEC in several ways. First, it made them 
responsible for handling the elaborate notif cation system, through which national 
standards bodies were to communicate projects and draw s of national standards. Second, 
it enforced the obligations on national standards bodies arising from their statutes on 
a ‘standstill’ on any work that could prejudice harmonization eb orts of standards at 
European level.7 And third, it launched a procedure through which the Commission 
can ‘request’ the European standards bodies to draw up European standards. d e 1985 
Council Resolution on the New Approach then made a treasure of this nascent pool of 
European standards in order to solve the second problem. From now on, Community 
directives covering entire sectors would limit themselves to formulating ‘essential 
requirements.’ Conformity with these requirements, then, was to be ‘presumed’ for 
products that complied with European harmonized standards.8
As a tool towards the completion of the internal market, the New Approach was 
undeniably a masterstroke.9 And yet, unease with the system was widespread from 
the outset.10 In so far as the Community legislator seemed to delegate regulatory tasks 
to the private European standards bodies, the new system was clearly at odds with the 
Court’s Meroni doctrine, according to which the Commission could delegate powers 
5 Sux  ce it to refer to Directive 87/402/EEC on roll-over protection structures mounted in front of the 
driver’s seat on narrow-track wheeled agricultural and forestry tractors, [1987] OJ L 220/1, which runs 
for 43 pages, and Directive 84/438/EEC on the permissible sound power level of lawnmowers, [1984] OJ 
L 183/9, adopted six years aw er the Commission’s proposal, [1979] OJ C 86/9.
6 Directive 83/189/EEC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the f eld of technical 
regulations and standards, [1983] OJ L 109/8. It was replaced by the consolidated version of Directive 
98/34/EC, [1998] OJ L 205/37.
7 Article 7(1) of the Directive instructed Member States ‘to take all appropriate measures’ to ensure that 
national standards bodies do not draw up or introduce standards in f elds covered by work on European 
standards.
8 Council Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonisation and standards, [1985] OJ C 136/1.
9 Authoritative cheerleading in J. Pelkmans, ‘d e New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization’, 25 Journal of Common Market Studies 3 (1987), p. 249.
10 See e.g. the excellent account in J. Falke, ‘Achievements and Unresolved Problems of European 
Standardization: d e Ingenuity of Practice and the Queries of Lawyers’, in C. Joerges, K.-H. Ladeur 
and E. Vos (eds.), Integrating Scienti8 c Expertise into Regulatory Decisionmaking- National Traditions 
and European Innovations (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1997), p. 187.
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to private parties only under very strict conditions.11 Paradoxically, then, for a long 
time it was felt that the only way to ensure the legality of the New Approach was to 
keep the standardization system at arm’s length from the legal system, and preferably 
a bit further still. d is was achieved, in particular, by the insistence that harmonized 
standards remained of ‘voluntary application.’ A precondition for this was, of course, 
that the ‘essential requirements’ would be ‘worded precisely enough in order to create, on 
transposition into national law, legally binding obligations which can be enforced’.12 In 
other words, compliance with harmonized standards was to remain but one of the ways 
of showing conformity to ‘essential requirements’: manufacturers and importers should 
be free to show conformity by other means.13
Relations between the Commission and the European standards bodies were strictly 
contractual, not hierarchical: modalities of cooperation were set out in Guidelines for 
Cooperation,14 and CEN remained perfectly free to reject ‘requests’ for harmonized 
standards. And, lastly, the Commission, for the longest time, strictly denied any 
responsibility or accountability for the decision to endorse the proposition that a 
particular harmonized standard met the ‘essential requirements’. d e ox  cial doctrine is 
well captured in this passage:
d e European standards organizations are responsible for identifying and elaborating 
harmonized standards and for presenting a list of adopted harmonized standards to the 
Commission. d e technical contents of such standards are under the entire responsibility 
of the European standards organizations. (…) New Approach Directives do not foresee a 
procedure under which public authorities would verify or approve either at Community level 
or national level the contents of harmonized standards, which have been adopted with the 
procedural guarantees of the standardization process.15
If the New Approach was originally perceived at best as a necessary evil, it soon turned 
to be considered better, and respectable and better. It was taken up in the cause of 
11 Case 9/56 Meroni [1958] ECR 133. On the tension between new governance and the Meroni doctrine, 
see e.g. R. Dehousse, ‘Misf ts: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance’, in C. Joerges 
and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2002), p. 207.
12 Section B (III), Annex II (the ‘Model Directive’), Council Resolution on a new approach to technical 
harmonization and standards, [1985] OJ C 136/1. d is turned into a rather unfunny joke when 
Directive 2001/95/EC on General Product Safety Directive, [2002] OJ L 11/4, turned the general 
safety requirement (of presenting ‘only minimal risk compatible with the product’s use, considered as 
acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection for the safety and health of persons’) into a 
New Approach ‘essential requirement’.
13 See also Recital 11, Decision 768/2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, [2008] 
OJ L 218/82.
14 d e f rst version of these, stemming from 1984, was not even published in the Ox  cial Journal. d at 
changed with the 2003 version, General guidelines for the cooperation between CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI and the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association, [2003] OJ C 9177.
15 Commission, Guide to the implementation of Directives based on the New Approach and the Global 
Approach (Opoce, Luxembourg 2000), p. 28.
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subsidiarity in the early 1990s as an instance of devolving regulatory responsibility 
to where it belonged.16 It was consecrated as a model for European governance in 
the 2001 White Paper on Governance which called for a wider use of ‘frameworks 
of co-regulation’, drawing on the practical expertise of the actors most concerned, 
which should result in ‘wider ownership of the policies in question by involving 
those most ab ected’.17 As a fore-runner of ‘new governance’ arrangements,18 the New 
Approach had come of age by the late 2000s as an example – for better or for worse – of 
‘integration through de-legalisation’.19 In 2012 all of that – for better or for worse – 
changed radically.
§3. HARMONIZED STANDARDS AND THE FREE 
MOVEMENT OF GOODS
Had the Court decided Fra.bo 30 years ago, then the New Approach would likely never 
have happened. By holding a national private standards body liable under Article  34 
TFEU, the Court has now solved the problem of the reach of the regime on the free 
movement of goods to standards that are both private and ‘voluntary’. By deciding this 
in 2012, however, the Court has not provided a solution to a problem, but has posed a 
problem for the solution. To understand the implications of the case, it is best to start 
with another judgment, the obscure 2008 decision in Commission v. Belgium.20 d ere, 
the Commission complained about regulatory arrangements in Belgium whereby a 
presumption of conformity with legislative requirements was conferred on products 
bearing the mark of the IBN, the Belgian standards body. d e Court recalled its case law 
to the eb ect that the mere fact that an importer might be ‘dissuaded’ from introducing 
or marketing a product in the Member States concerned constitutes a ‘restriction’ on the 
free movement of goods.21 It then went so far as to hold that a Member State infringes 
Article 34 TFEU even when it ‘encourages’ economic operators to obtain national marks 
16 See e.g. Commission Communication, On a Broader Use of Standardisation in Community Policy, 
COM (1995) 412 f nal, p. 4 (‘Recourse to standardization could, in principle, replace regulatory action 
with voluntary standardization action in sectors of Community activity. Since it is based on consensus, 
and relies on acceptance of the results by those who will use them, standardization follows the principle 
of subsidiarity to a high degree’).
17 Commission White Paper, European Governance, COM (2001) 428, p. 21.
18 See e.g. K. Armstrong, ‘d e Character of EU Law and Governance: From “Community Method” to 
New Modes of Governance’, 64 Current Legal Problems 1 (2011), p. 179, and M. Dawson, ‘d ree Waves 
of New Governance in the European Union’, 36 European Law Review (2011), p. 208.
19 C. Joerges, ‘Integration d rough De-legalisation?’, 33 European Law Review 3 (2008), p. 291.
20 Case C-227/06 Commission v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 March 2008. Summary publication in [2008] 
ECR I-46. d e full text of the judgment is available (in French only) from the Court’s website.
21 Case C-286/07 Commission v. Luxembourg, Judgment of 24 April 2008, para. 2. Summary publication 
in [2008] ECR I-63. d e full text of the judgment is available, only in French, from the Court’s website.
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of conformity for products lawfully marketed in another Member State.22 Now, the 
Commission complained both about legislative and regulatory measures and about the 
activities of IBN itself. Given the legal status of IBN, however, the Court had little trouble 
classifying its standardization and certif cation activities as ‘State measures’.23
In Fra.bo,24 the Court had to do with the Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas – und 
Wasserfaches (DVGW), a non-prof t body governed by private law, which sets technical 
standards for the water industry and certif es compliance with those standards. 
Certif cation by the DVGW lends a presumption of conformity with the general 
requirement that only products that follow ‘the acknowledged rules of technology’ 
may be used in the industry. d at requirement in turn, is found in the Regulation on 
General Conditions for Water Supply (the AVBWasserV), which lays down general sales 
conditions for water supply undertakings and their customers, from which parties are 
free to depart. Fra.bo, an Italian producer of copper f ttings, found itself in trouble when 
the DVGW amended the relevant standard to include the requirement to withstand a 
test of immersion for 3,000 hours in boiling water. Unable to produce test results to 
the satisfaction of the DVGW,25 Fra.bo had its current certif cate cancelled and a new 
one refused. It then brought proceedings against DVGW for impeding its access to the 
German market in contravention of its rights under Article 34 TFEU. Contrary to the 
IBN, however, the DVGW is a private-law body which the state does not f nance nor has 
decisive in uence over.26 d e Court framed the question it faced as follows:
It must therefore be determined whether, in the light of inter alia the legislative and regulatory 
context in which it operates, the activities of a private-law body such as the DVGW has the 
eb ect of giving rise to restrictions on the free movement of goods in the same manner as do 
measures imposed by the State.27
d at analysis, in turn, took the form of an anti-formalist reading of the AVBWasserV. First, 
the Regulation leaves the option open of verifying compliance with the ‘acknowledged 
rules of technology’ by a dib erent procedure than certif cation by the DVWG. d e Court 
refused to recognize this as a viable alternative, however, in light of the administrative 
dix  culties and additional costs associated with it.28 Second, the Regulation merely lays 
down general sales conditions from which parties are free to depart: in other words, there 
is no binding legislative requirement to adhere to the ‘acknowledged rules of technology’, 
22 Case C-227/06 Commission v. Belgium, para. 69.
23 Ibid., para. 37.
24 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para. 24.
25 d ere was an issue in the case about the refusal by the DVWG to recognize as equivalent the inspection 
reports issued by an Italian laboratory. d ough potentially important in the larger scheme of things, 
the matter was of no consequence for the issues discussed here: as far as is evident from the judgment, 
Fra.bo never put its f ttings to the 3,000 hours test.
26 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para. 24.
27 Ibid., para. 26.
28 Ibid., para. 29.
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let alone to bear a DVGW mark. d is, too, the Court dismissed, noting that, ‘in practice, 
almost all German consumers purchase copper f ttings certif ed by the DVGW’.29 d e 
Court then concluded that the DVWG, ‘by virtue of its authority to certify the products, 
in reality holds the power to regulate the entry into the German market’ of products such 
as copper f ttings.
In the blinding light of Advocate General Trstenjak’s grandiose Opinion,30 to many 
commentators Fra.bo seems to be a case about the horizontal direct eb ect of Article 34 
TFEU.31 According to this view, it is odd and wilfully obscure that the Court refuses 
to engage in Walrave-like reasoning and omits the citation of a single relevant case 
from the Bosman-Wouters-Viking range.32 Even stranger, the Court doesn’t seem to be 
particularly interested in the actual ‘activities’ of the DVWG, concentrating instead 
exclusively on the ‘legislative and regulatory context’ in which it operates. d e better 
view is probably hidden in the dead angle of the preliminary reference procedure. 
d e referring Court asked about the compatibility of the DVGW’s measures; what the 
Court of Justice is answering is really a question about the compatibility of the German 
regulatory framework.
In the light of Commission v. Belgium, the Court must be of the view that the 
AVBWasserV falls foul of Article 34 TFEU: as does the Belgian regulatory framework, it 
‘encourages’ operators to seek certif cation by a standards body even if it doesn’t formally 
impose it. Against that background, Fra.bo stands for a fairly limited proposition: if state 
measures are infringing the free movement of goods by encouraging economic operators 
to comply with standards, the mere fact that the standards and certif cates concerned 
are private measures will not render those state measures suddenly lawful. And against 
the same background, it makes perfect sense for the Court not be interested at all in the 
actual activities of the DVWG: if the ob ence lies in the act of ‘encouraging’ operators to 
seek certif cation, it is really of no consequence whether that certif cation is based on the 
Fra.bo’s f ttings resisting 3,000 hours or just 5 minutes in boiling water.
In order to gauge the implications of Commission v. Belgium and Fra.bo for European 
standards, it should be remembered that the Court considers it settled case law that 
Article 34 TFEU applies to the institutions of the European Union in the same way as 
29 Ibid., para. 30. Emphasis added.
30 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, delivered on 28 March 2012, not yet 
reported.
31 See e.g. the exuberant editorial by N. Shuibhne, ‘d e Treaty is going to get you…’, 37 European Law 
Review (2012), p.  367; W.-H. Roth, ‘Die “horizontale” Anwendbarkeit der Warenverkehrsfreiheit 
(Art. 34 AEUV)’, Europäisches Wirtscha? s- und Steuerrecht (2013), p. 16, and H. Van Harten and T. 
Nauta, ‘Towards direct horizontal eb ect for the free movement of goods?’, 38 European Law Review 5 
(2013), p. 677.
32 On the doctrine generally, see H. Schepel, ‘Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitution, 
and To Tell the Dib erence: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law’, 
18 European Law Journal 2 (2012), p. 177.
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it applies to Member States:33 in other words, any measure taken by the Commission 
that ‘dissuades’ operators from marketing their products in the internal market will be 
subjected to the discipline of the free movement of goods. d e similarities between the 
regulatory arrangements at issue in these two cases and the New Approach will not be 
lost on anyone: under the New Approach, too, certif cation to harmonized standards is 
formally voluntary, but de facto it is prohibitively expensive and complicated to prove 
conformity with the essential requirements by alternative means. Under the New 
Approach, too, consumers purchase, in practice, only products bearing CE marks. d e 
European standards body, CEN, too, ‘in reality’ holds the power to regulate entry into 
the internal market of products covered by the New Approach. And so it is hard to think 
of a good reason why harmonized standards and the regulatory arrangement of the 
New Approach itself should not be held to fall within the reach of Article  34 TFEU. 
And it would be hard to think of a plausible reason why any disab ected producer whose 
products are excluded by a harmonized standard – and every standard excludes certain 
products and favours others – could not, now, seek judicial review in any court in the 
European Union of national standards transposing harmonized standards. Whether the 
issue even came to the Court’s mind or not, the judgment in Fra.bo seems to have made 
one thing clear: measures under the New Approach will not escape judicial review any 
longer on the theory that harmonized standards are ‘private’ and ‘voluntary’.
Having been brought within the scope of the free movement of goods does not, of 
course, spell the end of the New Approach. d e ‘essential requirements’ in directives 
will generally be considered to be within the reach of the grounds for justif cation in 
Article 36 TFEU and under the Court’s doctrine of ‘mandatory requirements’.34 But 
CEN may now well have a case to make in explaining how a harmonized standard is 
necessary – and proportionate – for the achievement of those public interests. And 
the Commission will now have a case to make in explaining how and why it considers 
particular harmonized standards to be compatible with the ‘essential requirements’ in 
the f rst place.
§4. HARMONIZED STANDARDS AND LEGALITY REVIEW
As originally conceived under the system of the New Approach, harmonized standards 
were not adopted, endorsed, or even recognized by the Commission. d e grandmother 
33 See e.g. Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451, para 49. 
See e.g. K. Mortelmans, ‘d e Relationship between the Treaty Rules and Community Measures for the 
Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market- Towards a Concordance Rule’, 39 Common 
Market Law Review 6 (2002), p. 1303, and K. Sørensen, ‘Reconciling Secondary Legislation with the 
Treaty Rights of Free Movement’, 36 European Law Review 3 (2011), p. 339.
34 See generally e.g. C. Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justif cations and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest 
Really Protected?’, in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), 4 e Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart, 
Oxford 2009), p. 273.
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of all New Approach Directives, the Low Voltage Directive of 1973, announced 
innocently:
For purposes of information, the list of harmonized standards and their references shall be 
published in the Ox  cial Journal.35
In line with this, the acts of publication of the references are consistently called 
Commission ‘communications’, and are found in the C series of the Ox  cial Journal.36 
Under the New Approach proper, the publication lost some of its innocence where it 
was f rmly established that the presumption of conformity was bestowed only to those 
standards ‘the references of which have been published in the Ox  cial Journal’.37 d e 
act of publication thus has considerable consequences, as Member States are barred by 
standing case law from introducing any requirements additional to those contained in 
such harmonized standards.38 And yet, until very recently, the Commission denied that 
the act of publication implied a prior assessment of the standard’s compatibility with 
the essential requirements,39 and doubts remained whether it constituted a contestable 
decision under Article 263 TFEU.40
By design or not, the 2012 Regulation on Standardization now makes it clear that 
the act of publication of the references to harmonized standards is an act susceptible to 
legality review in direct actions. d e development is perhaps best explained by tracing 
the evolution of the so-called formal objection procedure f rst. In its most common form 
in early New Approach Directives, the relevant clause reads as follows:
Where a Member State or the Commission considers that the harmonized standards (…) 
do not entirely meet the essential requirements (…) the Commission or the Member State 
concerned shall bring the matter before the Standing Committee set up under Directive 
83/189/EEC, giving the reasons therefor.
35 Article 5, Low Voltage Directive 73/23/EEC, [1973] OJ L 77/29. Emphasis added. Shockingly, the clause 
has survived the recast; see Article 5, Low Voltage Directive 2006/95, [2006] OJ L 374/10.
36 See e.g. Commission Communication in the framework of the implementation of Directive 2009/48 on 
the safety of toys, [2013] OJ C 149/2.
37 Article R8, Annex to Decision 768/2008.
38 See e.g. Case C-112/97 Commission v. Italy [1999] ECR I-1821, Case C-100/00 Commission v. Italy [2001] 
ECR I-2785; Case C-103/01 Commission v. Germany [2003] ECR I-5369, and Case C-6/05 Medipac-
Kazantzidis [2007] ECR I-4557.
39 See e.g. Commission Report, Ex  ciency and Accountability in European Standardization under the 
New Approach, COM (98) 291 f nal, para. 7 (‘public authorities have committed themselves to not 
insisting on approving the technical content of harmonized standards; no positive decision is required 
by which authorities approve the standards, even if previously such technical aspects were subject to 
regulation’).
40 See e.g. R. Lauwaars, ‘d e “Model Directive” on Technical Harmonization’, in R. Bieber et al. (eds.), 
1992: One Internal Market? (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1988), p.151.
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d e Committee shall deliver an opinion without delay. In the light of the Committee’s opinion, 
the Commission shall inform the Member State whether or not it is necessary to withdraw 
those standards from publication.41
In this formulation, the procedure is clearly meant as an ex post emergency brake, to 
deal with problems arising from the application of harmonized standards aw er their 
references had been published. In practice, however, the procedure was triggered on 
various occasions before publication.42 d e 2008 Decision acknowledges that reality, and 
proposes the following standard formulation of the second sentence of the clause:
In the light of the Committee’s opinion, the Commission shall decide to publish, not to 
publish, to publish with restriction, to maintain, to maintain with restriction or to withdraw 
the references to the harmonized standards concerned in or from the OH  cial Journal.43
d e ex ante application of the procedure makes it impossible to maintain, as the 
Commission has done for a very long time, that the act of publication of the references 
to harmonized standards is a mere matter of ‘information’. Implicitly, the shiw  from 
‘inform’ to ‘decide’ in the second sentence conf rms this. More conf rmation is found 
in the new Regulation, which recasts the procedure once more and amends several 
directives accordingly.
d e new text gives Member States and the European Parliament the right to object, 
but not the Commission itself. According to the old conception of the act of publication 
as an act of providing information, the anomaly of the Commission objecting to an act 
of the Commission could be explained away. Now, however, it seems accepted that the 
Commission has to take a decision to publish the references, based on a prior assessment: 
in that case, it is only right and proper that the Commission should not be allowed to 
object to itself.
d e new Regulation separates the ex ante and ex post procedures according to dib erent 
modalities provided for in the Comitology Regulation. d e Standing Committee hence 
gives an opinion under the advisory procedure whether ‘to publish, not to publish or 
to publish with restrictions’ the references to harmonized standards: this involves the 
Committee taking a decision by simple majority, and the Commission taking ‘utmost 
account’ of the opinion. d e Committee gives its opinion whether ‘to maintain, to 
maintain with restriction or to withdraw’ the references to harmonized standards 
already published in the OH  cial Journal under the examination procedure: this involves 
the Committee taking a decision by qualif ed majority, and the Commission being 
bound by that opinion.44
41 See e.g. Article 6, Simple Pressure Vessels Directive 87/404/EEC, [1987] OJ L 220/48. Emphasis added.
42 See e.g. Commission Decision relating to the publication of the references for standards EN 13428, EN 
13429, EN 13430, EN 13431, and EN 13432, [2001] OJ L 190/21.
43 Article R9 (2), Decision 768/2008. Emphasis added.
44 See Article  11 juncto Article  22, Regulation 1025/2012, referring to Articles  4 and 5 of Regulation 
182/2011, [2011] OJ L 55/13. d e procedure is used sparingly. In its report over 2009 and 2010, the 
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Against this background, the formulation in the 2012 Regulation leaves little room 
for serious debate:
Where a harmonized standard satis8 es the requirements which it aims to cover and which are 
set out in the corresponding Union harmonisation legislation, the Commission shall publish 
a reference of such harmonized standard without delay in the Ox  cial Journal.45
With this, it seems beyond doubt that the act of publication of the references is an act that 
can be challenged in a direct action before the European Courts under Article 263 TFEU. 
d e subsequent question is then about standing.
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, what was then Article 230(4) EC demanded from private 
parties that they show that the contested act was of ‘direct and individual concern’ to 
them. d is was notoriously dix  cult under the so-called Plaumann-test of the Court of 
Justice as regards the latter limb of the test. ‘Individually’ concerned were those parties 
that are ab ected by the act ‘by reason of attributes which are peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances in which they are dib erentiated from all other persons’.46
d e Treaty of Lisbon has famously abolished the test of ‘individual concern’ in 
Article 263(4) TFEU for private parties where they challenge the legality of ‘a regulatory 
act which is of direct concern to them and which does not entail implementing 
measures’.47 A ‘regulatory act’ has been def ned by the Court as ‘all acts of general 
application apart from legislative acts’,48 a category that includes at least all acts of 
general application adopted by the Commission ‘in the exercise of implementing powers 
and not in the exercise of legislative powers’.49 It is therewith beyond doubt that the 
Commission’s decision to confer the presumption of conformity on certain harmonized 
standards can in principle be challenged by private parties, provided they can show that 
the act is of ‘direct’ concern to them. d e category of persons whose legal situation is 
‘directly ab ected’ by the fact that a presumption of conformity is bestowed on certain 
standards seems fairly substantial. It would include national standards bodies who, even 
if they were outvoted in CEN, are still obliged to transpose harmonized standards as 
their own. It would include the stakeholders that the new Regulation gives determined 
procedural rights to.50 Aw er Fra.bo, the category has become enormous. If we take that 
judgment seriously, the theory of viable alternatives to compliance with ‘voluntary 
Commission mentions 7 cases over two years: in three cases the presumption of conformity was 
maintained, in four cases it was restricted or withdrawn. See Commission report, d e Operation of 
Directive 98/34/EC in 2009 and 2010, COM (2011) 853 f nal, p. 9.
45 Article 10 (6), Regulation 1025/2012. Emphasis added.
46 Case 25/62 Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 95.
47 See generally e.g. L. Gormley, ‘Access to Justice: Rays of Sunshine on Judicial Review or Morning 
Clouds on the Horizon?’, 36 Fordham International Law Journal 5 (2013), p. 1169.
48 See Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Judgment of 3 October 2013, not yet reported, para. 60.
49 See Case T-262/10 Microban v. Commission [2011] ECR II-7697.
50 Article 5 Regulation 1025/2012.
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standards’ for proving conformity to the legislative requirements will no longer bar 
each and every disab ected manufacturer or importer whose products are excluded from 
harmonized standards from seeking judicial review. d e f nal result, then, is a paradox: 
whereas technical specif cations laid down in ‘old approach’ directives would be safe 
from judicial review under Article 263(4) TFEU as ‘legislative acts’, the act of recognition 
of private standards by the Commission are open to challenge by almost anyone who has 
an axe to grind.
§5. CONCLUSION
In Latchways,51 a mischievous Dutch judge asked the Court of Justice to interpret the 
terms of harmonized standard EN 795 – ‘Protection against falls from a height – Anchor 
devices – Requirements and testing’. One of the issues at stake was whether a certain 
product could legitimately bear the CE mark for conformity with the Personal Protective 
Equipment Directive even if it had failed a test under EN 795, that of resisting, under 
certain heat conditions, a static force of 10kN. d e Court was quick to point out that the 
publication of the reference to EN 795 carried an explicit warning to the eb ect that the 
presumption of conformity did not extend to the requirements on the product in question. 
Gratefully, the Court could then regard EN 795 for the purposes of the dispute in question 
as ‘a technical standard laid down by a private standards organization and unconnected 
to Directive 89/686’. It could, then, in turn, decline the referring Court’s invitation by 
holding that, ‘without there being any need to consider the legal nature of the harmonized 
standards’, the standard in this case did not constitute a provision of EU law.52
Latchways was always going to be a narrow escape, as the Court opened itself up for 
a contrario reasoning: would it, in slightly dib erent circumstances, consider technical 
requirements in standards covered by the presumption of conformity on products 
covered by a specif c directive as part of Union law? Would it really corner itself in a 
position where it has to answer questions concerning ‘the validity and interpretation’ of 
harmonized standards? Would it have to come to a judgment whether a requirement to 
resist 10kN bears a reasonable relation to an ‘essential requirement’? Does it even know 
what a kiloNewton is?
It is to be doubted whether the Court, here as in Fra.bo, or the Union legislators 
when they passed the new Regulation, were fully aware of the consequences of their 
actions. Had this been a conscious, concerted eb ort to ‘break down the club house’ of 
European standardization,53 we might feel a little more positive about it all. But this 
51 Case C-185/08 Latchways [2010] ECR I-9983.
52 Ibid., para. 32–36.
53 R. van Gestel and H.-W. Micklitz, ‘European Integration d rough Standardization: How Judicial 
Review is Breaking Down the Club House of Private Standardization Bodies’, 50 Common Market Law 
Review (2013), p. 145.
2
e
 P
R
O
E
F
d e New Approach to the New Approach: d e Juridif cation 
of Harmonized Standards in EU Law
20 MJ 4 (2013) 533
recent juridif cation spree is, frankly, rather likely to do more harm than good. Yes, it 
is intuitively attractive to open up private standardization to judicial review. Standards 
bodies are dominated by private interests and yield enormous power; they exercise that 
power largely behind closed doors and are accountable to no one in particular. d e legal 
imperative is clearly to require and monitor a high level of expertise, transparency, 
balance and fairness in standardization. To have each and every manufacturer 
or importer complain in each and every court of the Union about each and every 
harmonized standard that adversely ab ects its position on the market, however, is much 
more likely to lead to wholesale paralysis than it is to increase the procedural integrity 
of European standardization. Moreover, to withstand scrutiny by judges who probably 
fail to grasp even the basics of the technical questions involved, CEN will have to draw 
on legal resources it doesn’t have, and the Commission on technical resources it doesn’t 
have. d ere may be a lot wrong with European standardization, but it is hard to see how 
clogging up the system with litigation will remedy much of it.
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